Transboundary conflict of the Nile: a hydro-post-colonial legacy? Part 2 – Equitable Allocations

BLOG 6: Transboundary conflict of the Nile: a hydro-post-colonial legacy?

Part 2 – Equitable Allocations

In this blog, I wish to explore further the Nile Basin and the issue of ‘equitable’ allocations (Wolf, 1999).

In Elhance’s paper (2000) ’Hydropolitics: Grounds for Despair, Reasons for Hope’ he referred to the term ‘colonial-era mentality’ to refer to Egypt’s stubbornness in upholding the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian agreement. As aforementioned in an earlier blog, this agreement by in large gave Egypt a hydro-monopoly (there’s that hydro-‘insert word’ again…) so it’s easy to understand exactly why Egypt’s dogged determination to uphold it.

However, I find myself frustrated with Elhance’s paper as whilst he argues that hydro-politics is inherently and increasingly complex, and a difficult concept to understand, it seems the justification he offers for why that is, is equally difficult to digest. He notes that trans-boundary in nature is problematic, and that the complexity of hydro-politics multiplies as ‘water resources are depleted and the demand for water increases’ (Elhance, 2000). Whilst all true, I initially struggled to see these as simply causes of complexity of hydro-politics in the case of Nile – but more so as symptoms.  Partly just because I wanted to challenge him, but mainly because he’s giving reasons why it’s becoming more complex, rather than why it is the case in the first place. So, I set to investigate what other underlying issues there might be hindering a trans-boundary solution.

So trans-boundary solution, why you playin’ so hard to get?

Well, this question requires us to look back at the numerous agreements and diplomacy efforts – which we did so in the previous blog. A consistent theme that pervades throughout is Egypt’s, and often Sudan’s, lack of willingness to co-operate – as reflected by the rejection of signing the 2010 Nile River Basin Co-operative Framework (CFA). But is this stubbornness borne out of the facts that Elhance mentions, or does it come back to the messy politics that Egypt has been complicit in? Or is it both? Whilst treaties of the colonial era demonstrated the tremendous impact they had, international law too had its fair share.

The 1966 Hesinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, an agreement based on the ‘reasonable and equitable use of water resources’ which factors in rationale such as:

·      The hydrology of the basin

·      The past utilisation of the waters of the basin

·      The geography of the basin

·      The economic and social needs of each basin State

(Demin, 2015).

Yet, despite these facts, Egypt favoured arguments of chronology and history – constantly referring to the 1929 agreement as being considerate of all of the above reasons. If one were to assess the contribution of water by each Basin State, as illustrated in Figure 1, Sudan would trump all (Denim, 2015).

If the Helsinki Rules were properly adhered to, then there wouldn’t have really been a need for a Nile Basin Initiative – because there would exist an ‘equitable’ solution, right? Indeed, as Demin (2015) notes – whilst international law dictates there should exist an equitable and reasonable share of the river for all riparian’s, it is due to de facto practices – due to a multitude of reasons, that it is not the case. It is ironic that Egypt argue that history is one of the reasons as to they are most deserving of it, though history is surely the study that we learn from our mistakes.

Wolf (1999) paper is of particular use, where he critiques the UN Convention of 1997 for being ‘vague’ and contradictory – and not helping devise equitable allocations between riparian states. He makes particular reference to Articles 5 and 7: Article 5 advocates reasonable and equitable use of water resources, whereas Article 7 suggesting that any use is permissible insofar ‘appropriate measures are in place to prevent the causing of significant harm to other watercourse (riparian) States’ (UN Convention, 1997).

I guess then the messiness comes from agreements – as these are what reinforcing the hegemonic mentality that Egypt is demonstrating. It is on these treaties, particularly that of 1929, that Egypt uses to justify the claims it makes. The mentality could be said to be symptomatic of the inherent flaws in these agreements. Through Wolf’s assessment, Elhance’s (2000) statements suggesting an inherently complex hydropolitics is true – and this is multiplying as the nationally available water resources are depleted, whilst demand keeps growing.

So it seems, hydro-colonial legacy – through its pervasive mentality, continues to instil a certain stubbornness to the countries that such mentality favoured and continues to favour. Egypt is that country in the case of the transboundary conflict that exists in the river Nile. The mentality it persists to uphold is both a product and subject of the colonial roots that so fervently championed it.

In conclusion, I was certainly well out of my depth to try critique Elhance to the extent I did (Elhance, off chance that you’re reading this, I’m sorry). His reasons for why hydro-politics is so complex were certainly reasons, and causes, for concern. This corroborates Demin’s (2015: 204) argument that ‘the problem of regulation and use of waters of the transboundary Nile river is highly multi-faceted’. International law does not always uphold to what its ethos purportedly exclaims, as clearly, equitable division does not currently exist. I have come to find that this complexity has had dire consequences for the management of water resources, and the Nile offered an interesting historical perspective. Indeed, I am aware that this may not be the case for all transboundary conflicts – as they are all context specific.  In future posts, I’d like to consider the case for more emerging cases – such as IWRM and groundwater.

List of references:


Kalron, N. (2010) 'A 'transparent gold' rush?', African Security Review, 19, 3, 110-113.

Elhance, A. (1999) Hydropolitics of the Third World: Conflict and Cooperaiton in International River Basins, Washington, D.C: United States Institure of Peace Press.

Elhance, A. (2000) 'Hydropolitics: Grounds for Despair, Reasons for Hope', International Negotiation, 5, 201-222.

Denim, A. (2015) ‘Distribution of Water Resources: A Case Study of the Transboundary Nile River’, Geography and Natural Resources, 36, 2, 198-205.

Wolf, A. (1999) 'Criteria for equitable allocations: the heart of international water conflict', Natural Resources Forum, 23, 3-30.

Journal of International Law, 3, 1, 345-372.
BBC News (2010) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8682387.stm