Groundwater in Africa – a blessing being cursed?

BLOG 7: Groundwater in Africa – a blessing being cursed?

Ah, groundwater! You may be thinking that this blog entry is somewhat a departure from the pervading theme of colonialism in my recent blogs, given that the interest in groundwater is a seemingly new phenomenon -  e.g.it took until 2008 in Kampala for the first conference (Taylor et al., 2012). Well, you’d be wrong. As we will find out, I argue that whilst groundwater indeed offers a great potential in meeting domestic, agricultural and industrial water demands, the potential for groundwater is being increasingly and inherently hydro-compromised (I couldn’t help myself...) – because of hydro-colonialism and the principles it continues to perpetuate.

Firstly, why the interest in groundwater?

Well. There is no doubt it is a vital source of freshwater and given that groundwater supplies can be maintained during periods of little or no rainfall and help to even out meteorological variability (MacDonald et al., 2011), it is particularly vital in areas that rainfall and river discharge are otherwise ranked the most variable on Earth – integral for Africa as we found out in my opening blog. As such, its it provides a fantastic resilient option to meet increasing domestic demand, access to safe water and enhancing food security e.g. through irrigation (IGRAC, 2016), not to mention tackling the challenges of climate change (Taylor, 2004) and population increase (WorldBank, 2016) – which are set to impact Africa more than any other region in the World (Conway, 2011). It has garnered a huge level of interest so much so that a body of international scientists are coming together to explore its dynamics, through avenues such as ‘The Chronicles Consortium” where I believe a certain Richard Taylor is the Co-Chair… (note: Richard is my professor who is assessing me on this blog... hopefully he’ll appreciate the plug and consequently give me full marks).

Great, so what’s the issue?

Indeed, its merits are and have been realised. For example, 80% of the domestic rural water supplies in Sub-Saharan Africa derive from groundwater (Calow et al 2010).However, acknowledging the true benefits of groundwater in response to climate variability is still yet to be spread (Conway, 2011) – and where the benefits are known, the infrastructure to extract it may not yet be in place. Unfortunately, in some places, we are coming to see that those who are seeing its benefits, and those who have/can bring the infrastructure, are those with ulterior motives than hastening the development of Africa. This is already beginning to be the case in Ethiopia, where Nestle have been found guilty of groundwater extraction that has resulted in hundreds of people being relocated (Corporate Watch, 2016).

There is also the example of The Nubian Sandstone Aquifer System (NSAS) - one the world’s largest ‘fossil’ groundwater aquifer – covering two million square kilometres.  Chad, Egypt, Libya and Sudan agree on framework for joint management of this system, however, these players have illustrated that

So what does this mean for groundwater in Africa?

Unfortunately then, I strongly feel that areas with an abundance of groundwater are likely to become more susceptible to land grab in the near future. Whilst surface water continues to be a focal point, companies like Nestle are beginning to notice the woes of climate change and consequently begun shifting effort to the ‘goldmine’ of groundwater that exists beneath ground.  Governments are allowing such companies to infiltrate and these examples can be seen in blog 5. Hydro-colonial legacy continues to influence water resource management and it comes back to our old friend that money > lives. I believe this is why countries such as Ethiopia etc are favouring TNC involvement.

Whilst groundwater brings with it huge potential, it is a shame this potential is going to be constantly undermined. In this vein then I argue that groundwater does not provide a panacea for alleviating water stress, due to being constantly undermined by the governance structures and politics that undermine its utility. It should not be thought of independent to the politics and management that surround it.

My suggestion is that law and regulation must seek to ensure the primary use of groundwater is for subsistence through activity such as small-scale irrigation systems and managed by local communities. Groundwater must become more than just a fashionable statement.  The water resource management plans must ensure the rights of locals are not compromised, which means they must not be simply resettled.

 Even beyond and before all this though, it would be nice to not pressure the people in African countries to be forced to extract more of their rightful Groundwater sources than necessary, because of the anthropogenic climate change that we are inducing – and that they are least responsible for. So, yes, even we are becoming complicit in exacerbating the dangers they face.  You see, there really is a domino effect to the purportedly innocuous things we do.

I have digressed in this blog and at times answered the question on whether scarcity leads to conflict, rather than groundwater being undermined by hydro-colonialism.

References:

https://corporatewatch.org/company-profiles/nestl%c3%a9-sa-corporate-crimes#water

Calow R C. et al. 2010 Ground Water 48, 246–56.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-17775211

https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/nov/24/africa-water-grab-land-rights

https://actions.sumofus.org/a/nestle-just-doubled-the-amount-of-groundwater-it-can-suck-up-just-120-miles-from-flint

Taylor, R.G., Scanlon, B.R., Doell, P., Rodell, M., van Beek, L., Wada, Y., Longuevergne, L., LeBlanc, M., Famiglietti, J.S., Edmunds, M., Konikow, L., Green, T., Chen, J., Taniguchi, M., Bierkens, M.F.P., MacDonald, A., Fan Y., Maxwell, R., Yechieli, Y., Gurdak, J., Allen, D., Shamsudduha, M., Hiscock, K., Yeh, P., Holman, I. and Treidel, H., 2013. Groundwater and climate change. Nature Climate Change, Vol. 3, 322-329.

Taylor, R.G., Todd, M., Kongola, L., Nahozya, E., Maurice, L., Sanga, H. and MacDonald, A., 2013. Evidence of the dependence of groundwater resources on extreme rainfall in East Africa. Nature Climate Change, Vol. 3, 374-378.

http://nora.nerc.ac.uk/15772/

Transboundary conflict of the Nile: a hydro-post-colonial legacy? Part 2 – Equitable Allocations

BLOG 6: Transboundary conflict of the Nile: a hydro-post-colonial legacy?

Part 2 – Equitable Allocations

In this blog, I wish to explore further the Nile Basin and the issue of ‘equitable’ allocations (Wolf, 1999).

In Elhance’s paper (2000) ’Hydropolitics: Grounds for Despair, Reasons for Hope’ he referred to the term ‘colonial-era mentality’ to refer to Egypt’s stubbornness in upholding the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian agreement. As aforementioned in an earlier blog, this agreement by in large gave Egypt a hydro-monopoly (there’s that hydro-‘insert word’ again…) so it’s easy to understand exactly why Egypt’s dogged determination to uphold it.

However, I find myself frustrated with Elhance’s paper as whilst he argues that hydro-politics is inherently and increasingly complex, and a difficult concept to understand, it seems the justification he offers for why that is, is equally difficult to digest. He notes that trans-boundary in nature is problematic, and that the complexity of hydro-politics multiplies as ‘water resources are depleted and the demand for water increases’ (Elhance, 2000). Whilst all true, I initially struggled to see these as simply causes of complexity of hydro-politics in the case of Nile – but more so as symptoms.  Partly just because I wanted to challenge him, but mainly because he’s giving reasons why it’s becoming more complex, rather than why it is the case in the first place. So, I set to investigate what other underlying issues there might be hindering a trans-boundary solution.

So trans-boundary solution, why you playin’ so hard to get?

Well, this question requires us to look back at the numerous agreements and diplomacy efforts – which we did so in the previous blog. A consistent theme that pervades throughout is Egypt’s, and often Sudan’s, lack of willingness to co-operate – as reflected by the rejection of signing the 2010 Nile River Basin Co-operative Framework (CFA). But is this stubbornness borne out of the facts that Elhance mentions, or does it come back to the messy politics that Egypt has been complicit in? Or is it both? Whilst treaties of the colonial era demonstrated the tremendous impact they had, international law too had its fair share.

The 1966 Hesinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, an agreement based on the ‘reasonable and equitable use of water resources’ which factors in rationale such as:

·      The hydrology of the basin

·      The past utilisation of the waters of the basin

·      The geography of the basin

·      The economic and social needs of each basin State

(Demin, 2015).

Yet, despite these facts, Egypt favoured arguments of chronology and history – constantly referring to the 1929 agreement as being considerate of all of the above reasons. If one were to assess the contribution of water by each Basin State, as illustrated in Figure 1, Sudan would trump all (Denim, 2015).

If the Helsinki Rules were properly adhered to, then there wouldn’t have really been a need for a Nile Basin Initiative – because there would exist an ‘equitable’ solution, right? Indeed, as Demin (2015) notes – whilst international law dictates there should exist an equitable and reasonable share of the river for all riparian’s, it is due to de facto practices – due to a multitude of reasons, that it is not the case. It is ironic that Egypt argue that history is one of the reasons as to they are most deserving of it, though history is surely the study that we learn from our mistakes.

Wolf (1999) paper is of particular use, where he critiques the UN Convention of 1997 for being ‘vague’ and contradictory – and not helping devise equitable allocations between riparian states. He makes particular reference to Articles 5 and 7: Article 5 advocates reasonable and equitable use of water resources, whereas Article 7 suggesting that any use is permissible insofar ‘appropriate measures are in place to prevent the causing of significant harm to other watercourse (riparian) States’ (UN Convention, 1997).

I guess then the messiness comes from agreements – as these are what reinforcing the hegemonic mentality that Egypt is demonstrating. It is on these treaties, particularly that of 1929, that Egypt uses to justify the claims it makes. The mentality could be said to be symptomatic of the inherent flaws in these agreements. Through Wolf’s assessment, Elhance’s (2000) statements suggesting an inherently complex hydropolitics is true – and this is multiplying as the nationally available water resources are depleted, whilst demand keeps growing.

So it seems, hydro-colonial legacy – through its pervasive mentality, continues to instil a certain stubbornness to the countries that such mentality favoured and continues to favour. Egypt is that country in the case of the transboundary conflict that exists in the river Nile. The mentality it persists to uphold is both a product and subject of the colonial roots that so fervently championed it.

In conclusion, I was certainly well out of my depth to try critique Elhance to the extent I did (Elhance, off chance that you’re reading this, I’m sorry). His reasons for why hydro-politics is so complex were certainly reasons, and causes, for concern. This corroborates Demin’s (2015: 204) argument that ‘the problem of regulation and use of waters of the transboundary Nile river is highly multi-faceted’. International law does not always uphold to what its ethos purportedly exclaims, as clearly, equitable division does not currently exist. I have come to find that this complexity has had dire consequences for the management of water resources, and the Nile offered an interesting historical perspective. Indeed, I am aware that this may not be the case for all transboundary conflicts – as they are all context specific.  In future posts, I’d like to consider the case for more emerging cases – such as IWRM and groundwater.

List of references:


Kalron, N. (2010) 'A 'transparent gold' rush?', African Security Review, 19, 3, 110-113.

Elhance, A. (1999) Hydropolitics of the Third World: Conflict and Cooperaiton in International River Basins, Washington, D.C: United States Institure of Peace Press.

Elhance, A. (2000) 'Hydropolitics: Grounds for Despair, Reasons for Hope', International Negotiation, 5, 201-222.

Denim, A. (2015) ‘Distribution of Water Resources: A Case Study of the Transboundary Nile River’, Geography and Natural Resources, 36, 2, 198-205.

Wolf, A. (1999) 'Criteria for equitable allocations: the heart of international water conflict', Natural Resources Forum, 23, 3-30.

Journal of International Law, 3, 1, 345-372.
BBC News (2010) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8682387.stm

Transboundary conflict of the Nile: a hydro-post-colonial legacy?

BLOG 5: Transboundary conflict of the Nile: a hydro-post-colonial legacy? Part 1 – The context in relation to NBI and The Great Renaissance Dam

So given my conclusion that hydro-colonialism can also entail thoughts and discourses as well as its practices (such as land grabbing) through hydro-post-colonialism in a previous blog, I thought I’d investigate how it plays out in transboundary conflict using the case of the Nile. In my quest to understand this, it is important to assess firstly exactly why/how, and between whom, the Nile is a source of conflict. In this blog I review colonial-era decisions and treaties and how these relate to current debates within the Nile Basin Initiative.

Indeed, 11 countries lay claim to sharing some of the water of the river Nile. Yet, only one has enjoyed what can be described as an exemplary definition of a ‘monopoly’.  Egypt has for most of recorded history been afforded unquestionable access to the Nile. It is from this domination that Wolf’s (1999) assertion - that the issue of ‘equitable’ allocation is what lies at the ‘heart of most international water conflicts’  - is particularly applicable here, as most countries including Tanzania, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, DR Congo, Kenya, Eritrea, South Sudan and Sudan make their complaints on these grounds. Ethiopia starkly exemplifies this inequitable situation – given that the Blue Nile, by which Egypt finds 80% of its annual water (Kendie, 1999), is actually located in Lake Tana – which is in Ethiopia.

Historically, a number of treaties have enabled Egypt to enjoy this level of domination. Before I review these, I’ll treaty you to a fun fact – did you know that a Greek Legend named Heredotus claimed that Egypt was ‘the gift of the Nile’ (Kendie 1999)? Anyway…

The 1929 agreement between Sudan and Egypt allowed Egypt to control the allocation of the Nile’s water. Countries could not alter river flow (such as through dam construction) without first seeking the permission of Egypt, whereas Egypt were allowed such activity without any necessary consultation with the riparian nations. Indeed, it was due to the British rule that this level of power was argued to be an ‘unfair vestige of colonialism’ (New York Times, 2010).

It was in fact this treaty, though revised in 1959 but with little effect, which led to the inception of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI). In between these treaties, dialogue between riparian nations was generally conducted through international mediators such as the World Bank (Teshome, 2009). The NBI, created in 1999, was a “joint program of action whose aim is to ensure co-operation and economic integration, sustainable resource development and security’ (Teshome, 2009). In many ways then it was seen as a response to this ‘inequitable’ situation that existed, and sought to contest the 1929 agreement through the four main objectives:

1 – To develop the Nile River water resources in a equitable and sustainable manner in order to ensure prosperity, security and peace for the inhabitants

2- To guarantee effective water management and optimal resource use

3- To promote co-operation and combined action between member countries

4- To combat poverty, and promote economic integratiom

(Teshome, 2010).

An integral aspect of the NBI was the Co-operative Framework Agreement (CFA) – which sought to establish ‘principles, rights and obligations to ensure long-term and sustainable management and development of the shared Nile waters’ (NBI, 2016). As of March 2015, it was signed by Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Tanzania… And no prizes for noticing whose name isn’t on the list (Egypt)! Whilst the NBI was seemingly a move in the right direction for its emphasis on co-operation, by 2014 Egypt had a new focus by which to argue against co-operation: The Great Renaissance Dam in Ethiopia.

This Dam, planned to be complete in 2017, would hold 70 billion cm3 of water to generate 6,000 mW – thereby fortifying Ethiopia’s energy security. Indeed, the internal political turmoil in Egypt perhaps allowed less focus on the Dam as it otherwise may have had – but this didn’t stop the government from campaigning against the projects development arguing that it would both decrease and pollute the waters that reached it – in which Egypt depended on so heavily (Al Jazeera, 2014). Ethiopia, however, defended their rights and persisted that what would be Africa’s largest hydroelectric dam could even improve water flow to Egypt by reducing evaporation at Lake Nasser (ibid). This was until 2015 – when Sudan, Ethiopia and Egypt signed a deal which was ‘designed to ease fears that a controversial new dam could spark a regional conflict (Euro News, 2015). It is ambiguous as to exactly what level of diplomacy took place to reach this deal – but it is certainly clear that Egypt brought it’s A-game – given that the deal is set to give Egypt preferential treatment.

It can be said then that both the NBI and the Great Renaissance Dam serve as political symbols that clearly made efforts to reject the colonial agreements that favoured Egypt so greatly. Indeed, the latter in particularly I feel has compromised for the sake of purportedly ‘avoiding conflict’ – in a later blog I’ll go into more detail that conflict (between nations and states particularly) is often strongly avoided and thereby unlikely, compared to conflict within states particularly. Nonetheless, the NBI certainly played a big role in alleviating tension and bringing parties together for constructive dialogue – though for this to bear the best fruits, Egypt must concede from its neo-colonial mentality.

It is clear then that Egypt is eager to maintain the powers that the agreements from the colonial era reinforced. Whether this can be argued a post-colonial mentality perhaps requires a more nuanced approach, but I would certainly say that these treaties had a tremendous impact in shaping the paradigms that govern today – and in this blog I have reviewed them against current debates.

A summary of the treaties is provided here:

References:

See blog 6.