Transboundary conflict of the Nile: a hydro-post-colonial legacy?

BLOG 5: Transboundary conflict of the Nile: a hydro-post-colonial legacy? Part 1 – The context in relation to NBI and The Great Renaissance Dam

So given my conclusion that hydro-colonialism can also entail thoughts and discourses as well as its practices (such as land grabbing) through hydro-post-colonialism in a previous blog, I thought I’d investigate how it plays out in transboundary conflict using the case of the Nile. In my quest to understand this, it is important to assess firstly exactly why/how, and between whom, the Nile is a source of conflict. In this blog I review colonial-era decisions and treaties and how these relate to current debates within the Nile Basin Initiative.

Indeed, 11 countries lay claim to sharing some of the water of the river Nile. Yet, only one has enjoyed what can be described as an exemplary definition of a ‘monopoly’.  Egypt has for most of recorded history been afforded unquestionable access to the Nile. It is from this domination that Wolf’s (1999) assertion - that the issue of ‘equitable’ allocation is what lies at the ‘heart of most international water conflicts’  - is particularly applicable here, as most countries including Tanzania, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, DR Congo, Kenya, Eritrea, South Sudan and Sudan make their complaints on these grounds. Ethiopia starkly exemplifies this inequitable situation – given that the Blue Nile, by which Egypt finds 80% of its annual water (Kendie, 1999), is actually located in Lake Tana – which is in Ethiopia.

Historically, a number of treaties have enabled Egypt to enjoy this level of domination. Before I review these, I’ll treaty you to a fun fact – did you know that a Greek Legend named Heredotus claimed that Egypt was ‘the gift of the Nile’ (Kendie 1999)? Anyway…

The 1929 agreement between Sudan and Egypt allowed Egypt to control the allocation of the Nile’s water. Countries could not alter river flow (such as through dam construction) without first seeking the permission of Egypt, whereas Egypt were allowed such activity without any necessary consultation with the riparian nations. Indeed, it was due to the British rule that this level of power was argued to be an ‘unfair vestige of colonialism’ (New York Times, 2010).

It was in fact this treaty, though revised in 1959 but with little effect, which led to the inception of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI). In between these treaties, dialogue between riparian nations was generally conducted through international mediators such as the World Bank (Teshome, 2009). The NBI, created in 1999, was a “joint program of action whose aim is to ensure co-operation and economic integration, sustainable resource development and security’ (Teshome, 2009). In many ways then it was seen as a response to this ‘inequitable’ situation that existed, and sought to contest the 1929 agreement through the four main objectives:

1 – To develop the Nile River water resources in a equitable and sustainable manner in order to ensure prosperity, security and peace for the inhabitants

2- To guarantee effective water management and optimal resource use

3- To promote co-operation and combined action between member countries

4- To combat poverty, and promote economic integratiom

(Teshome, 2010).

An integral aspect of the NBI was the Co-operative Framework Agreement (CFA) – which sought to establish ‘principles, rights and obligations to ensure long-term and sustainable management and development of the shared Nile waters’ (NBI, 2016). As of March 2015, it was signed by Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Tanzania… And no prizes for noticing whose name isn’t on the list (Egypt)! Whilst the NBI was seemingly a move in the right direction for its emphasis on co-operation, by 2014 Egypt had a new focus by which to argue against co-operation: The Great Renaissance Dam in Ethiopia.

This Dam, planned to be complete in 2017, would hold 70 billion cm3 of water to generate 6,000 mW – thereby fortifying Ethiopia’s energy security. Indeed, the internal political turmoil in Egypt perhaps allowed less focus on the Dam as it otherwise may have had – but this didn’t stop the government from campaigning against the projects development arguing that it would both decrease and pollute the waters that reached it – in which Egypt depended on so heavily (Al Jazeera, 2014). Ethiopia, however, defended their rights and persisted that what would be Africa’s largest hydroelectric dam could even improve water flow to Egypt by reducing evaporation at Lake Nasser (ibid). This was until 2015 – when Sudan, Ethiopia and Egypt signed a deal which was ‘designed to ease fears that a controversial new dam could spark a regional conflict (Euro News, 2015). It is ambiguous as to exactly what level of diplomacy took place to reach this deal – but it is certainly clear that Egypt brought it’s A-game – given that the deal is set to give Egypt preferential treatment.

It can be said then that both the NBI and the Great Renaissance Dam serve as political symbols that clearly made efforts to reject the colonial agreements that favoured Egypt so greatly. Indeed, the latter in particularly I feel has compromised for the sake of purportedly ‘avoiding conflict’ – in a later blog I’ll go into more detail that conflict (between nations and states particularly) is often strongly avoided and thereby unlikely, compared to conflict within states particularly. Nonetheless, the NBI certainly played a big role in alleviating tension and bringing parties together for constructive dialogue – though for this to bear the best fruits, Egypt must concede from its neo-colonial mentality.

It is clear then that Egypt is eager to maintain the powers that the agreements from the colonial era reinforced. Whether this can be argued a post-colonial mentality perhaps requires a more nuanced approach, but I would certainly say that these treaties had a tremendous impact in shaping the paradigms that govern today – and in this blog I have reviewed them against current debates.

A summary of the treaties is provided here:

References:

See blog 6.